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DOES RAISING THE SCHOOL LEAVING AGE REDUCE TEACHER
EFFORT? EVIDENCE FROM A POLICY EXPERIMENT
COLIN GREEN and MARI´A NAVARRO PANIAGUA∗
This paper examines the effect of an increase in the compulsory school leaving
age on a measure of high school teachers’ effort. Differences-in-Differences estimates
using count data methods demonstrate that the policy led to teachers increasing
their hours of sickness absence by roughly 15%. This result implies that raising the
compulsory school leaving age reduces teaching inputs, and hence schooling quality.
A policy implication is that these laws should be coupled with measures to compensate
teachers for the additional disutility. This also suggests that instrumental variable
estimates of returns to education that utilize these changes for identification may be
downwardly biased. (JEL J22, J38)
I. INTRODUCTION
Raising the compulsory school leaving age
(henceforth RoSLA) is a key policy instrument
used to increase minimum educational attain-
ment levels. Moreover, there is an ongoing
debate in a number of countries, such as the
United Kingdom and Spain, regarding further
increases in the minimum high school leav-
ing age. In addition, RoSLA has been widely
used in the literature on returns to education
as a source of exogenous variation in years of
schooling/educational levels (see for instance,
Harmon and Walker 1995 for the United King-
dom; Pischke and von Wachter 2008 for Ger-
many; Pons and Gonzalo 2002 and Arrazola
et al. 2003 who use the 1970 RoSLA in Spain).
However, teachers who take classes in the
“affected” years of schooling are unlikely to be
indifferent to this policy change.1 Increasing the
compulsory schooling age increases the number
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1. That is, teaching previously noncompulsory years of
schooling that became mandatory.
of students in those years, but also changes
the distribution of ability and motivation of
students that teachers have to instruct. For
instance, teachers at the latter part of compulsory
secondary school will now have lower ability
students and/or those with less interest in for-
mal schooling in their class, along with those
students who would have voluntarily chosen
post-compulsory schooling in the absence of
the legislative change. Teaching (and manag-
ing) these students is likely to be more difficult.
In the absence of compensating differentials, it
is difficult to imagine that this will not affect
teacher motivation and effort.2
This paper is the first to our knowledge that
investigates this motivational effect of compul-
sory schooling laws on teachers. Specifically, we
examine the impact of the increase in the school
leaving age that occurred in Spain in the academic
year 1998–1999 on one element of high school
teacher behavior, absenteeism. Employing Span-
ish Labor Force Survey (SLFS) data that covers
the relevant policy reform period, we estimate
2. To our knowledge generally, and in the particular
case we examine, compulsory schooling changes were not
introduced with an increase in either the supply of high
school teachers or improvements in teacher salaries and/or
conditions (Boyd-Barret and O’Malley 1995).
ABBREVIATIONS
DID: Differences-in-Differences
IRR: Incident Rate Ratio
RoSLA: Raising of the School Leaving Age
SLFS: Spanish Labor Force Survey
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Difference-in-Difference models of absenteeism
using count data approaches. We demonstrate
that raising the compulsory schooling age led
to an increase in teacher absenteeism. This is
a matter of concern as previous research has
demonstrated a negative causal effect of teacher
absence on student achievement (Duflo, Hanna,
and Ryan 2005; Miller, Murnane, and Willett
2007, 2008), and one that is more severe for
students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds
(Clotfelter, Ladd, and Vigdor 2009). This may be
the result of absent teachers being replaced by less
qualified substitutes and/or the disruption inher-
ent in the use of replacement teachers.
This leads to a concern that increasing the
compulsory school leaving age may decrease the
quality of educational provision in the affected
years. Furthermore, this has implications for
estimation of the returns to education that rely
upon RoSLA reforms as an instrumental vari-
able. Namely, that if the education treatment
because of RoSLA is of lower quality, then the
local average treatment effect of education on
wages will be biased downward.
II. DATA
The policy reform examined consisted of
an extension of free, compulsory, and com-
prehensive education from 14 to 16 years. The
reform was the General Regulation of the Edu-
cation System passed in 1990.3 Because of
the economic crisis of the 1990s in Spain, the
change in compulsory schooling was delayed
until the last quarter of 1998. Primary and high
school curriculum standardization across Spain
was another part of this reform. Primary and
early secondary school standardization occurred
before the changing of the compulsory school
leaving age. While curriculum standardization
for 15- to 16-year-old students occurred at the
same time, the compulsory leaving age was
raised. This could influence high school teacher
behavior if, for instance, this adjustment was
onerous and/or disruptive. Hence, any RoSLA
policy effect could include an adjustment effect
as a result of curriculum change. We examine
the potential for the policy effect to be con-
founded by this implementation period in later
robustness checks. From the last quarter of 1998
on students that otherwise would have dropped
out (in the previous academic year were in the
3. In Spanish, Ley de Ordenacio´n General del Sistema
Educativo , 1990 (LOGSE).
last year of compulsory schooling) were obliged
to stay two more years at school. This leads
to compulsory education comprising a total of
10 years, divided into two educational levels:
primary education (6–12 years old) and lower
secondary education that it is ordinarily com-
pleted from the ages of 12–16 years old.4
Increasing the school leaving age may, be-
cause of the need to increase the teaching labor
force, lead to a distributional change in teacher
characteristics. This is similar to the point raised
by Jepsen and Rivkin (2009) regarding the con-
sequence of decreasing class sizes. Increasing
the teaching workforce to cope with an increased
student body may lead to, for instance, less qual-
ified or less experienced teachers being hired
who may be more frequently absent. Alterna-
tively, increased compulsory schooling could
lead to larger class sizes which could increase
teacher disutility and/or exposure to contagious
illness and thus increase absence. It does not
appear, however, that high school class sizes
increased at the time of RoSLA in Spain. In
fact there was a small decrease, from 26.4 stu-
dents per class in 1997–1998 to 26.0 and 25.5 in
1998–1999 and 1999–2000, respectively (MEC
2010b). At the same time, there is no evidence
of increases in high school teacher numbers,
either in official data MEC (2010a) or in the
representative sample of high school teachers
we use. While we cannot be definitive about
the source of this apparent discrepancy, this
may have occurred because of the reduction
in the age cohort from which high school stu-
dents were drawn over the 1990s. For instance,
there were 3.3 million people in Spain aged
12–16 in 1990 (8.8% of the population) and this
fell to 2.6 million (6.3% of the population) by
1998, representing a 31% decrease in this age
group. This, coupled with the well-documented
strong employment protection in Spain (most
high school teachers are civil servants), meant
that teachers were not fired when student num-
bers fell, and this we believe led to an increase
in teaching capacity up to the time of the reform.
The data we use is drawn from the SLFS, a
quarterly repeated cross-sectional survey that is
representative at both the national and regional
level in Spain. We select a sample of full-time
employees in the period spanning 1st quarter
of 1996 to 4th quarter of 2004. Self-employed
workers are excluded. The full sample consists
4. Although students can stay in school until they are 18
(or 21 in the case of pupils with special education needs).
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of about 988,329 workers, 2.57% of them are
high school teachers. We are able to identify
high school teachers (and distinguish them from
primary school teachers) in our data as the
SLFS reports three digit disaggregated occupa-
tion codes (ISCO) for all workers. In Spain,
secondary education teachers must have a uni-
versity degree, only teach subjects of their field
of specialization, and are primarily civil ser-
vants who attained their post through state or
regionally competitive exams. In all estimates,
we control for both public sector and temporary
contracts, 85% of the teachers work in the public
sector and 64% are on permanent contracts.
To test the robustness of our results, we use a
number of subsamples. This includes dropping
the vacation period (third quarter of the year
surveys) as teachers have more summer holi-
days than many other workers. Furthermore, to
ensure that the timing of other holidays is not
generating our results, we estimate our models
on two successively more restrictive samples.
The first is workers in the education industry
only and in the second we include only primary
and secondary school teachers. These latter two
groups have essentially identical holiday sched-
ules and provisions. The second sample contains
63,811 workers in the education sector, and the
third sample is comprised of 49,711 primary
and secondary school teachers (Table 1). Impor-
tantly our key results are robust to the choice of
these samples.
We use information on the hours of absence
per week reported as being due to sickness to




















Source: SLFS, authors’ own calculations.
5. The SLFS has been demonstrated to have an interna-
tionally consistent definition of absence (Barmby, Ercolani,
and Treble 2002).
this variable as the difference between usual
hours and actual hours for those that report
the reason of any difference between them as
due to sickness.6 Generally, paid sick leave is
very generous in Spain. While coverage may
vary slightly by sector or firm level agree-
ment, the norm is 1 month of absence leave
fully paid per year worked in Spain up to a
maximum of 18 months leave. If the worker
reaches their maximum leave entitlement they
have to attend a special panel which assesses
their sickness.
We appreciate that using sickness absence
only may be quite restrictive. In unreported esti-
mates our main results are robust to using more
broad definitions where we include differences
in usual and actual hours because of other forms
of absence including personal/family responsi-
bilities, bad weather, summer schedule/flexible
hours, and “other reasons.”
Figure 1 reports minutes of sickness absence
before and after RoSLA for three groups, high
school teachers, primary school teachers, and all
other workers. Prior to the policy introduction,
high school teachers had lower absence levels
than primary school teachers. This is similar
to the pattern found in other jurisdictions such
as in Australia (Bradley, Green, and Leeves
2008) and in the United States (Clotfelter, Ladd,
and Vigdor 2009). More detail is provided in
Appendix Figures A1 and A2 which show yearly
absence rates before and after RoSLA, again for
these three groups. These figures suggest that
RoSLA increased high school teacher absence
but not that of other workers. Moreover, this
increase does not seem to dissipate over our
sample period.
A range of control variables are available in
the SLFS. We use gender, age, age squared, mar-
ital status, education, public sector, type of con-
tract, industry dummies, occupation dummies,
and size of the firm/establishment. We also con-
trol for year, quarter, and regional (CCAA) fixed
effects so as to take regional differences into
account such as wage differences and unemploy-
ment rates because of different industrial struc-
tures within regions and patterns of morbidity.7
6. We consider usual hours as synonymous with contrac-
tual hours. This is similar in spirit to the approach used in
previous research such as Hamermesh, Myers, and Pocock
(2008) and Lozano (2011).
7. CCAA stands for Autonomous Communities in Span-
ish. Spain is administratively divided into 17 regions and two
autonomous cities. This division corresponds to the NUTS
level 2 established by Eurostat for statistical purposes.
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FIGURE 1













































































































Workers with non-zero absence
III. METHODOLOGY
In our baseline model, workers’ minutes of
absence per week can be specified as follows:
Absmit = φ + δRoSLAit + γβHSTi(1)
+ βRoSLAit × HSTi+ αXi + εi
i = 1, . . . , 988,329 and
t = 1996Q1, . . . , 2004Q4
where Absmit corresponds to the minutes of
absence of worker i in the period t . RoSLAit
is an indicator that takes value of unity if the
worker is observed during the reform period.
HSTi is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the
worker is a high school teacher and 0 other-
wise. And the interaction term RoSLAit × HSTi
equals 1 for treated individuals (HSTeachers) in
the post-treatment period (after the RoSLA was
implemented). The OLS estimate of β is equiv-
alent to the Differences-in-Differences (DID)
estimator and thus provides the absence caused
by the reform for the treated group (i.e., the
absence caused by the RoSLA for secondary
school teachers) (Cameron and Trivedi 2005,
890–91).
Our dependent variable, minutes of absence,
is a count variable. Moreover, there is an excess
of zero outcomes. This could occur during the
reference week both if (a) the worker/teacher
never gets sick and does not skip work dur-
ing the reference week but could have been
absent in the case of illness (sampling zeros);
(b) the worker/teacher always goes to work
because of commitment and motivation despite
illness (structural zeros). As a result, we estimate
zero-inflated models that allow for these exces-
sive number of zeroes in addition to overdis-
persion in the zero-inflated negative binomial
(ZINB) case. Importantly, zero-inflated mod-
els permit the zero absence of teachers to be
explained in a different manner than that of
those workers that are absent for more than
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zero hours. It combines a count density with
a binary process in such a way that a binary
model is estimated to predict, with probability
ψi , whether a worker will always have a zero
count (i.e., type b). Then, a count model (Pois-
son or negative binomial) chosen with proba-
bility 1 − ψi is generated to predict the counts
for those who will not always have a zero count
(type a). Then Absmi has a zero-inflated dis-
tribution given by Long (1997, 242–50). The
appropriateness of the zero-inflated models over
their non zero-inflated counterparts (i.e., Poisson
vs. zero-inflated Poisson [ZIP], negative bino-
mial vs. zero-inflated negative binomial) can
be tested using the approach set out by Vuong
(1989).
We estimate both ZIP and ZINB models:
Pr(Absmi = k|xi, zi)(2)
=
{
f1(0) + (1 − f1(0))f2(0) if k = 0
(1 − f1(0))f2(k) if k ≥ 1
where f1 corresponds to a binary process (i.e.,
logit) and f2 is a Poisson or negative binomial
density function. An assumption of Poisson
models is that the variance equals the sample
mean:
E(μi |xi) = exp(xiβ) = var(μi |xi).(3)
If this is not the case and the variance exceeds
the mean then the data are said to be over-
dispersed and the Poisson model will be ineffi-
cient. This can be overcome by using a negative
binomial model that adds a random term that
is assumed to be uncorrelated with the model’s
covariates. The Poisson is nested in the negative
binomial model, as it is the case where α = 0 in
Equation (5). The null hypothesis of no overdis-
persion, α : Ho(α = 0), can be determined via a
Likelihood-ratio test.
Zero-inflated Poisson:
Pr(Absmi = 0|xi, zi) = ψi + (1 − ψi )e−μi(4)
Pr(Absmi = k|xi)=(1−ψi )(e−μiμki )/(k!).
Zero-inflated negative binomial:
Pr(Absmi = 0|xi, zi) = ψi(5)
+ (1 − ψi )((α−1)/(α−1 + μi ))α−1
Pr(Absmi = k|xi)=(1 − ψi )((α−1 + k))/
((α−1)k!)((α−1)/(α−1 + μi ))α−1
(μi/(μi + α−1))k.
IV. RESULTS
Table 2 presents estimates of the effect of
RoSLA on high school teacher absence behav-
ior. Two sets of estimates are reported for
the ZIP and ZINB models, respectively. The
Vuong test (reported in each of the tables) sug-
gests that our zero-inflated models are a sig-
nificant improvement over standard Poisson or
negative binomial models. The likelihood-ratio
test in all cases rejects the null hypothesis of
no overdispersion (p value = .000). It indicates
that because of overdispersion the ZINB can
improve goodness-of-fit over the ZIP. Nonethe-
less, we report both sets of estimates to demon-
strate that our results are not being driven by
choice of model. For both models the policy
effect dummy (RoSLA × HSTeacher) demon-
strates a statistically significant increase in high
school teacher absenteeism as a result of the
RoSLA. Coefficient estimates from count data
models can be difficult to interpret so we also
present the incident rate ratio (IRR) or expo-
nentiated coefficient eβ. Thus, an IRR greater
than one indicates that the expected count in the
exposed group is greater than the expected count
in the unexposed group. These demonstrate that
the effect of the policy was to increase the
high school teacher’s hours lost through sick-
ness absence by 15% (IRR = 1.15).
Comparing high school teacher absence be-
havior and that of all other workers may be too
broad. For instance, there may be unobserved
changes to the incentives for worker absence
occurring for other occupations/industries dur-
ing the same period. Alternatively, there may be
some unobserved shock to teachers’ absence that
coincides with the policy change. These may
serve to bias our estimates of the policy effect
in some unknown way. To mitigate this problem
we examine our two successively more restric-
tive subsamples of workers, education workers
and teachers (high school and primary school).
As previously mentioned, focusing on the edu-
cation sector aims to eliminate the possibility
of bias originating from unobserved changes in
absence incentives in other industries. While
comparing primary and high school teachers
only has the added advantage that these workers
face a very similar holiday structure and leave
timing. The cost of these robustness checks are
decreased sample size and potentially less pre-
cise estimates.
Table 3 reports the estimates for these two
subsamples, where for brevity we only report
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TABLE 2
Changes in Compulsory Schooling Laws and Teacher Absenteeism, All Workers, SLFS 1996–2004
ZIPa ZINBb
RoSLA × HSTeacher 0.139∗∗ (0.069) 0.140∗∗ (0.071)
[1.150]∗∗ [1.150]∗∗
HSTeacher −0.202∗∗∗ (0.063) −0.203∗∗∗ (0.065)
[0.817]∗∗∗ [0.817]∗∗∗
RoSLA −0.028∗ (0.014) −0.029∗∗ (0.015)
[0.972]∗ [0.972]∗∗
Age 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
[1.001] [1.001]
Age2 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
[1.000] [1.000]
Female 0.003 (0.003) 0.003 (0.003)
[1.003] [1.003]
Married 0.004 (0.003) 0.004 (0.003)
[1.004] [1.004]
Secondary education −0.009 (0.007) −0.009 (0.007)
[0.991] [0.991]
Higher education −0.004 (0.008) −0.004 (0.008)
[0.996] [0.996]
Public sector −0.027∗∗∗ (0.006) −0.027∗∗∗ (0.006)
[0.974]∗∗∗ [0.974]∗∗∗
Temporary contract −0.006 (0.005) −0.006 (0.006)
[0.994] [0.994]
Establishment size
Workers 0–5 −0.022∗∗∗ (0.005) −0.022∗∗∗ (0.005)
[0.978]∗∗∗ [0.978]∗∗∗
Workers 6–10 −0.002 (0.005) −0.002 (0.005)
[0.998] [0.998]
Workers 11–19 0.004 (0.004) 0.004 (0.004)
[1.004] [1.004]
Workers 20–49 −0.003 (0.005) −0.004 (0.005)
[0.997] [0.996]
Observations 988,329 988,329
Vuong test 1,222.14 −2.60
p value .0000 .9953
Likelihood-ratio test 1.6 × 106
p value .0000
Notes: Controls for industry, workers’ occupation, region, year, and quarter are included but not reported. Robust standard
errors clustered at the regional level are in parentheses. IRR are in brackets.
aZero inflated Poisson.




, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, the 5%, and the 1% levels, respectively.
the key policy variable estimates. Again these
estimates reveal that the change in compulsory
schooling laws lead to an increase in teachers’
hours of sickness absence. Moreover, restricting
our sample leads to an increase in the magnitude
of this effect to 18%–20%, suggesting that our
earlier estimates were biased downward.
An additional issue is that we do not pos-
sess a nonpolicy control group (i.e., schools
or regions where there is no RoSLA). Hence,
there is the potential that our policy effect is
in actuality because of some contemporaneous
exogenous shock. To examine this, we conduct
robustness checks exploiting the regional vari-
ation in pre-RoSLA high school participation
rates. Specifically, we split our sample according
to the post-compulsory high school participa-
tion rates of the region prior to the reform.
The intuition is that schools in regions where
participation rates beyond compulsory educa-
tion were previously lower should be more
affected by RoSLA, that is, a larger proportion
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TABLE 3




School Teachers Education Workers
High/Primary
School Teachers
RoSLA × HSTeacher 0.162∗∗∗ (0.053) 0.180∗∗ (0.077) 0.172∗∗∗ (0.058) 0.189∗∗ (0.081)
[1.176]∗∗∗ [1.198]∗∗ [1.187]∗∗∗ [1.208]∗∗
HSTeacher −0.163∗∗∗ (0.055) −0.162∗∗ (0.072) −0.170∗∗∗ (0.059) −0.168∗∗ (0.074)
[0.849]∗∗∗ [0.850] [0.843]∗∗∗ [0.846]∗∗
RoSLA −0.029 (0.036) −0.145 (0.134) −0.032 (0.039) −0.155 (0.136)
[0.971] [0.865] [0.968] [0.857]
Observations 63,811 49,711 63,811 49,711
Vuong test 331.68 288.96 3.04 2.89
p value .0000 .0000 .0012 .0019
Likelihood-ratio test 8.0 × 104 6.5 × 104
p value .0000 .0000
Notes: All other controls are as in Table 2. Robust standard errors clustered at the regional level are in parentheses. IRR
are in brackets.
aZero inflated Poisson.




, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, the 5%, and the 1% levels, respectively.
TABLE 4
Changes in Compulsory Schooling Laws and Teacher Absenteeism, by Previous RoSLA
Participation Rates in Post-Compulsory Secondary Education
ZIPa ZINBb
<20% ≥20% <20% ≥20%
RoSLA × HSTeacher 0.359∗∗∗ (0.078) 0.073 (0.070) 0.397∗∗∗ (0.087) 0.080 (0.073)
[1.432]∗∗∗ [1.076] [1.487]∗∗∗ [1.084]
HSTeacher −0.342∗∗∗ (0.086) −0.084 (0.074) −0.374∗∗∗ (0.095) −0.089 (0.078)
[0.711]∗∗∗ [0.919] [0.688]∗∗∗ [0.915]
RoSLA −0.094 (0.109) −0.015 (0.048) −0.125 (0.111) −0.018 (0.054)
[0.910] [0.985] [0.883] [0.982]
Observations 20,925 42,886 20,925 42,886
Vuong test 161.35 266.94 1.84 2.46
p value .0000 .0000 .0329 .0070
Likelihood-ratio test 2.4 × 104 5.4 × 104
p value .0000 .0000
Notes: All other controls are as in Table 2. Robust standard errors clustered at the regional level are in parentheses. IRR
are in brackets. <20% and ≥20% columns comprise 7 and 11 regions, respectively.
aZero inflated Poisson.




, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, the 5%, and the 1% levels, respectively.
of students in these schools are treated by the
policy reform. Hence, if it is this policy that is
actually causing the change in teacher absence,
teachers in areas that previously had lower post-
compulsory participation rates in secondary edu-
cation should respond more. We re-estimate our
absence models split according to whether the
school was in a region with greater than or less
than 20% post-compulsory participation rates
prior to RoSLA,8 and report these estimates
in Table 4.9 The results demonstrate that the
8. We estimate this for the education sector sample as
there are insufficient observations if we use the teacher’s
only sample. These results are robust to alternative splits
of the regions such as greater or less than 25% of students
attending post-compulsory secondary education prior to the
reform.
9. Specifically they are biased downwards causing over-
estimation of significance levels.
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policy caused teacher absence to increase by
almost 50% in those regions with lower post-
compulsory high school education participation
before the reform was implemented. This result
increases our confidence that the rise in absence
we observe is caused by the policy reform.
We conduct four final sets of robustness
checks. First, we investigate whether our results
are generated by the year of policy implemen-
tation. For instance, this may have caused dis-
ruption to classrooms and teachers leading to an
increase in absence. We do this by excluding the
year of the reform from our sample. These esti-
mates are reported in the first row of Table 5 and
reveal that omitting the year of the reform does
not alter the key results; the magnitude remains
at approximately 20%. We use this approach as
the basis to investigate the longevity of the pol-
icy effect by further omitting the year after the
policy reform. The results in the last row of
Table 5 demonstrates again the robustness of the
main result and suggests that the policy contin-
ued to have an effect on high school teacher
absence until, at least, 2 years after the reform
year. This effect remained of the same magni-
tude. In addition, no policy effect was evident
when we investigated a placebo reform for the
year prior to the actual RoSLA.
Second, we re-estimate our models excluding
the summer quarter of the SLFS. This is per-
formed for two reasons, first the bulk of school
holidays occur in the summer quarter hence
the opportunity (or need) for teachers to take
sickness absence in this quarter are diminished.
Second, it has been suggested that increases
in temperature are generally associated with
increases in absence (Connolly 2008). Estimates
of these further restricted models are reported
in Table 6. The pattern of these estimates
largely follows those reported in Tables 2 and 3.
Together the results in Tables 3, 4, and 6 suggest
that our estimated impact of RoSLA on teacher
absence is not being driven by unobserved vari-
ations in holiday availability/timing or unob-
served shocks to the absenteeism of teachers.
As a further robustness check that our results
are not being driven by an unobserved exoge-
nous shock to absence at the time of the reform,
we examine RoSLA’s impact on a group of
workers who should be unaffected. Specifically,
we exclude all the education sector workers
from the sample and treat the remaining pub-
lic sector workers as the treatment group. In
Table 7, we show that the coefficient for this
“incorrect” treatment group is not significantly
different from 0. This further suggests that the
change in teacher absence is because of the
change in the school leaving age and not some
contemporaneous shock. One might also be
concerned that the March 11, 2004 attacks in
Madrid may also have influenced Spanish work
behavior regarding absenteeism. For instance,
Hotchkiss and Pavlova (2009) have demon-
strated that the September 11 attacks changed
the working hours of New York residents. We
investigated this by deleting 2004 from our
TABLE 5





School Teachers Education Workers
High/Primary
School Teachers
Excluding the reform period (1 year)
RoSLA × HSTeacher 0.182∗∗∗ (0.050) 0.182∗∗ (0.075) 0.191∗∗∗ (0.055) 0.192∗∗ (0.079)
[1.199]∗∗∗ [1.200]∗∗ [1.210]∗∗∗ [1.211]∗∗
Observations 61,268 47,783 61,268 47,783
Excluding the reform period (2 years)
RoSLA × HSTeacher 0.184∗∗∗ (0.049) 0.181∗∗ (0.076) 0.194∗∗∗ (0.055) 0.193∗∗ (0.080)
[1.202]∗∗∗ [1.199]∗∗ [1.214]∗∗∗ [1.212]∗∗
Observations 52,748 41,064 52,748 41,064
Notes: All other controls as in Table 2. Robust standard errors clustered at the regional level are in parentheses. IRR are
in brackets.
aZero inflated Poisson.




, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, the 5%, and the 1% levels, respectively.
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TABLE 6




School Teachers Education Workers
High/Primary
School Teachers
RoSLA × HSTeacher 0.145∗∗∗ (0.044) 0.182∗∗∗ (0.070) 0.151∗∗∗ (0.048) 0.188∗∗ (0.076)
[1.156]∗∗∗ [1.200]∗∗∗ [1.163]∗∗∗ [1.207]∗∗
HSTeacher −0.140∗∗∗ (0.047) −0.163∗∗ (0.065) −0.143∗∗∗ (0.050) −0.166∗∗ (0.070)
[0.870]∗∗∗ [0.850]∗∗ [0.867]∗∗∗ [0.847]∗∗
RoSLA −0.019 (0.046) −0.144 (0.132) −0.020 (0.047) −0.153 (0.138)
[0.982] [0.866] [0.980] [0.858]
Observations 48,433 37,771 48,433 37,771
Vuong test 315.20 289.98 3.10 3.05
p value .0000 .0000 .0010 .0011
Likelihood-ratio test 7.5 × 104 6.1 × 104
p value .0000 .0000
Notes: All other controls as in Table 2. Robust standard errors clustered at the regional level are in parentheses. IRR are
in brackets.
aZero inflated Poisson.




, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, the 5%, and the 1% levels, respectively.
TABLE 7
Changes in Compulsory Schooling Laws and Public Sector (Non-Education Worker) Absenteeism
All Periods Excluding Summer Quarter
ZIPa ZINBb ZIPa ZINBb
RoSLA × Treatment 0.056 (0.046) 0.053 (0.048) 0.045 (0.061) 0.043 (0.064)
[1.057] [1.055] [1.046] [1.044]
Treatment −0.082∗ (0.046) −0.080∗ (0.048) −0.069 (0.061) −0.066 (0.064)
[0.921]∗ [0.923]∗ [0.934] [0.936]
RoSLA −0.052∗∗ (0.026) −0.051∗ (0.027) −0.037 (0.031) −0.035 (0.033)
[0.949]∗∗ [0.951]∗ [0.964] [0.966]
Observations 923,586 923,586 693,317 693,317
Vuong test 1,186.29 −2.66 1,022.04 −2.03
p value .0000 .9961 .0000 .9787
Likelihood-ratio test 1.5 × 106 1.3 × 106
p value .0000 .0000
Notes: All other controls as in Table 2. Robust standard errors clustered at the regional level are in parentheses. IRR are
in brackets.
aZero inflated Poisson.




, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, the 5%, and the 1% levels, respectively.
sample and re-estimating our main models; our
key policy estimates were unaffected by this.
Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004)
demonstrate that standard errors in DID estima-
tors are inconsistent when panels with longer
time periods are used and the dependent vari-
able is serially correlated. We examine this by
collapsing the time dimension of our data into
two periods, pre- and post-RoSLA. We then
re-estimated (1) across these two periods and
these are reported in Table 8. Our resulting
estimate of the RoSLA effect is statistically
significant at the 1% level, and suggests a larger
policy effect of at least 50%. This suggests that
the statistical significance of our RoSLA esti-
mates is not the result of serial correlation in
absenteeism.
Having established a robust policy effect, we
now seek to provide some approximate quantifi-
cation of the magnitude of the policy effect on
teacher absence. In addition, while the estimates
have been concerned with intensive margins of
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TABLE 8
Changes in Compulsory Schooling Laws and







RoSLA× 0.496∗∗∗ (0.173) 0.653∗∗∗ (0.171)
HSTeacher [1.643]∗∗∗ [1.921]∗∗∗
HSTeacher −0.183 (0.197) −0.314 (0.224)
[0.833] [0.730]
RoSLA −0.399∗∗ (0.200) −0.332 (0.213)
[0.671]∗∗ [0.718]
Observations 12,347 12,347
Vuong test 117.24 6.09
p value .0000 .0000
Likelihood-ratio test 2.0 × 105
p value .0000
Notes: All other controls as in Table 2. Robust standard
errors clustered at the regional level are in parentheses. IRR
are in brackets.
aZero inflated Poisson.




, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%,
the 5%, and the 1% levels, respectively.
absence, we also provide some information on
the incidence of sickness absence which can be
considered a measure of the extensive margin.
Panel A of Table 9 reports the RoSLA marginal
effects from a probit of the probability of a
worker taking sickness absence in the reference
week. For our education worker sample this
reveals that the increase of high school teach-
ers’ absence because of the reform was 1.6 and
2.4 percentage points excluding summer holi-
days, respectively. Slightly lower magnitudes
are reported for the high school versus primary
school sector although there is a loss of preci-
sion in the estimates and these miss statistical
significance at standard levels.
Panel B of Table 9 reports the coefficients
of an OLS regression for those workers that
took absence due to sickness. Because of the
reform, high school teachers take 308 more
minutes of absence than their other education
sector counterparts. They take 337 more minutes
than primary education teachers because of
the reform, and the effect is that of 280 and
352 minutes for the two samples, respectively
when we exclude the summer quarter from
the data. These are broadly in line with the
15%–20% magnitude of policy effect reported
in our earlier count data models.
V. CONCLUSION
RoSLA is seen as a key instrument for
increasing basic education levels within society.
At the same time, it has been relied upon by
many researchers as a source of exogenous
variation in educational attainment in economet-
ric studies of the returns to education. In this
TABLE 9
Quantifying the Effect of RoSLA on Extensive and Intensive Margins of Absence









Panel A. Sickness absence (incidence), probit marginal effects
RoSLA × HSTeacher 0.016 0.011 0.024 0.013
(0.009)∗ (0.012) (0.011)∗∗ (0.019)
HSTeacher −0.010 −0.009 −0.012 −0.012
(0.008) (0.012) (0.011) (0.020)
RoSLA 0.005 0.011 0.010 0.025
(0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.020)
Observations 21,782 17,420 12,172 9,561
Panel B. Minutes of absence (OLS)
RoSLA × HSTeacher 307.570 336.969 279.665 351.523
(93.672)∗∗∗ (140.689)∗∗ (80.259)∗∗∗ (127.227)∗∗
HSTeacher −302.293 −299.363 −259.205 −308.671
(94.654)∗∗∗ (129.098)∗∗ (83.303)∗∗∗ (117.256)∗∗
RoSLA −53.577 −258.431 −31.578 −266.458
(87.580) (265.185) (105.083) (264.981)
Observations 927 789 805 694




, and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, the 5%, and the 1% levels, respectively.
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paper, we asked the question, how do teach-
ers react to the changes in teaching environment
implicitly created by retaining students at school
who would have otherwise left? Specifically,
we focus on one potential response, changes in
teacher absence behavior.
We examined changes in high school teacher
absence behavior because of an increase in
the school leaving age in Spain in the aca-
demic year 1998–1999. Using representative
labor force data we demonstrated that teachers
affected by this reform increased their absen-
teeism by 15%, rising to almost 50% in regions
that traditionally had lower post-compulsory
school participation. Our interpretation of this
result is that more onerous teacher environ-
ments lead to decreases in effort by high school
teachers. This result is of importance for two
related reasons. Given previous research that
establishes a link between teacher absence and
lower student performance, our results demon-
strate that increasing the compulsory school
leaving age has the potential to reduce edu-
cational quality. Second, our results suggest
that researchers using RoSLA or other policy
changes that may affect teaching conditions as
an instrumental variable should consider their
possible effects on educational “quality.”
This paper has considered the effect of
RoSLA on absence; future research should
consider the range of other potential reac-
tions of teachers (i.e., turnover, job satisfaction)
and the subsequent effect these have on chil-
drens’ outcomes.
Finally, a policy recommendation that is
derived from our work is that education authori-
ties should consider the need for increased com-
pensation or improved working conditions for
teachers adversely affected by increasing the
compulsory school leaving age.
APPENDIX
FIGURE A1
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FIGURE A2





























































































Workers with non-zero absence
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